We identify several theories that each suggest a link between CEO turnover and changes among a firm's top non-CEO managers. We then assess these links empirically using two panel data sets. We present five main findings. First, we find that CEO and non-CEO turnover are positively associated. Second, we do not find that this association is stronger when firm performance is poor. Third, this association is driven largely by instances of outside CEO succession. Fourth, the association between CEO and non-CEO changes persists; even the year after CEO turnover, non-CEO managers are more likely to leave the firm's top management group. Fifth, changes in the identities of non-CEO managers are more closely associated with subsequent organizational changes than is CEO turnover. We interpret these results as being consistent with theories in which non-CEO managers make investments in human capital that is specific to co-workers, and specific to the firm's current practices or strategy.
Introduction
In this paper, we use two panel data sets of publicly traded firms to analyze the relation between CEO turnover and contemporaneous changes in the identities of a firm's top non-CEO managers. While the large literature on CEO turnover has documented a significant link between firm performance and the likelihood of CEO departure (see Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and Barro and Barro (1990) ) and board composition and CEO departure (see Weisbach (1988) ), research in this field has not, to date, carefully examined employment outcomes among a firm's non-CEO executives. Recent work has focused instead on the association between CEO turnover and subsequent changes in firm performance or organizational form. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) and Denis and Denis (1995) , for example, use data from Japan and the US, respectively, to document that "non-routine" CEO changes are associated with subsequent improvements in firm performance. Weisbach (1995) shows that the probability a firm divests poorly performing assets increases after a CEO change. Similarly, Denis and Denis (1995) , Denis and Serrano (1996) , and Mulherin and Poulsen (1998) show that various forms of corporate restructuring are more common after changes in the CEO position.
One aspect of organizational change not addressed in the recent literature is the link between CEO changes and other changes among the firm's top managers. That is, to what extent are CEO changes associated with other changes in a firm's top management team? We believe this question to be interesting for two reasons. First, the composition of the top management team gives us another dimension on which to assess the link between CEO change and organization change. Second and, we believe, more important, the answer to this question may yield insight into the mechanism by which other organizational changes are implemented. If CEO changes tend to be associated with organizational changes (divestitures, restructurings, downsizings), then how and by whom are such changes put in place? Do new CEOs implement change by redirecting existing managers to adjust their strategies and actions, perhaps by changing the ways in which performance of those managers is measured and rewarded? Or is organizational change difficult to implement with the pre-existing management team, necessitating changes in the identities of the firm's remaining top decision makers as well? Motivated in part by Vancil's (1987) discussion of the CEO succession process, we begin by identifying three reasons why CEO turnover may coincide with changes among a firm's non-1 CEO managers. First, if boards receive correlated signals of CEO and non-CEO managers' performance, then performance-based dismissals of CEOs will be associated with performancebased dismissals of non-CEOs. Second, if firms use promotion-based tournaments to provide incentives to non-CEO managers, then the naming of a new CEO can reduce the value to non-CEOs of remaining with the firm. Third, if a non-CEO manager invests in human capital that is specific to his relationships with a CEO, then the value of this investment is lost when the CEO departs, leaving the non-CEO manager less valued by his employer. Clearly, these factors are not mutually exclusive; it could easily be the case, for example, that managers make investments that are specific to each other and that firms use promotion tournaments to provide incentives to lower level managers. Each argument yields a set of implications for the link between CEO and non-CEO turnover. We then conduct an empirical analysis to determine which of these explanations appears to best fit observed patterns of CEO and non-CEO change.
To do this, we collect two panel data sets consisting of identities of top managers of US firms.
The first data set is the widely used ExecuComp. The second consists of all publicly traded banks and thrifts in the United States between 1990 and 1999. In both data sets, we are able to observe, for each firm-year, the identities of the five most highly paid executives. Compiling this information into a panel, we can follow changes in each firm's "disclosure group" (that is, the firm's list of five highest-paid executives) over time. While we would ideally like to be able to include all executives within a firm who hold substantial decision making authority into our data, our sample is limited by the fact that the SEC requires firms to disclose the identities of only the five most highly paid managers. We argue, however, that five is sufficient to allow us to gain some understanding of the associations between CEO and non-CEO turnover.
Our empirical strategy is to estimate a series of logit models that allow the probability that a non-CEO manager departs the firm's disclosure group to be related to CEO turnover. Clearly, non-CEO managers may depart the firm's disclosure group for a number of reasons, and one concern is that disclosure group departure does not necessarily indicate that the non-CEO has left the firm. As we discuss at some length below, we address this by using the disclosure criteria in the SEC's rules to devise appropriate controls for the normal rate at which managers depart firms' disclosure groups. If we find that the rate at which non-CEOs depart the disclosure group changes around times of CEO turnover, then we can conclude that different factors act on the 2 composition of disclosure groups at these times.
We show that the link between CEO and non-CEO departure has four characteristics. First, we find that CEO and non-CEO turnover are positively associated. Second, we do not find this association to be stronger when firm performance is poor. Third, this association is driven largely by instances of outside CEO succession. Fourth, the association between CEO and non-CEO changes persists; even in the year after CEO turnover, non-CEO managers are more likely to leave the firm's top management group. We interpret our results as being most consistent with the hypothesis that non-CEO executives make human capital investments that are specific to relationships with other managers.
Our findings complement work by Weisbach (1995) and Denis and Denis (1995) , among others, who show that CEO turnover is associated with other organizational changes. We also extend that earlier work by offering some insight into the process of organizational change. We examine the association between CEO turnover, non-CEO turnover, and subsequent organizational changes, as measured by reductions in firms' assets and employment, and by firms' layoff announcements. We find that non-CEO disclosure group departure is associated with subsequent organizational changes. Further, non-CEO departure is more strongly associated with organizational changes than is CEO turnover.
Most prior work examining employment outcomes for non-CEO managers uses this form of turnover as simply a broader indicator of change at the top of the organization. For example, Warner et al. (1988) perform a series of firm-level logit regressions in which the dependent variable indicates whether there was a change in the Chairman, CEO or President positions in the preceding year. Furtado and Rozeff (1987) , Denis and Denis (1995) and Mikkelson and Partch (1997) apply a similarly broadened definition of executive turnover and examine links between stock prices, firm performance, and turnover. Kaplan (1994a) and Kaplan (1994b) examine cross-country patterns in the performance-turnover relationship by comparing representative directors in Japan, executive directors in the US, and management board members in Germany. Most comparable to our work is that of Helmich and Brown (1972) , who study 208 changes in the "President" position for evidence of associated turnover among other executives.
Helmich and Brown present chi-squared tests indicating an association between outside succession and turnover among other executives, but make no comparison between firms experiencing 3 turnover in the President position and those firms experiencing no turnover in this position.
One recent working paper does take a similar approach to ours. Like us, Fee and Hadlock (2002) show that non-CEO turnover is significantly higher near the time of CEO change and that this correlation is significantly strengthened when the new CEO comes from outside the firm. Their focus is somewhat different, however, in that they analyze S&P 500 firms exclusively and attempt to trace the reasons for each executive's departure. In addition, while our aim is to distinguish among theories that might explain our empirical results, Fee and Hadlock (2002) simply state that their results are consistent with several theoretical models. More specifically, they interpret their results as consistent with both a "team-specific human capital" model and a model where signals of managerial performance are correlated. Our results lead us to conclude the correlated signals model is not an important driver of the relationship between CEO and non-CEO change. Also, Fee and Hadlock (2002) do not examine the relationship between non-CEO turnover and measures of subsequent organizational change. 1 The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we outline several theories that may help explain patterns in non-CEO turnover. We describe our two data sets in Section 3.
In Section 4, we discuss our empirical analysis. We first detail our empirical strategy, and then present our findings. We conclude in Section 5.
CEO Turnover and Change Among Non-CEO Top Managers
In this section, we outline several theories that each suggest an association between CEO turnover and changes in the identities of a firm's top non-CEO managers. We focus our discussion on three factors that may lead these events to be linked, and develop implications from each. We then frame our empirical analysis around these sets of implications. After presenting our empirical analysis in Section 4, we discuss which of the these theories appears to best explain the pattern of associations between CEO and non-CEO changes.
We begin with the observation that an employment relationship between a firm and a non-CEO manager will continue if and only if the mutual gains from continued employment are 1 Fee and Hadlock (2002) perform several analyses that we do not, including determining the effect of dismissal on future employment prospects of individual executives. 4 positive. That is, non-CEO executives will remain with the firm if and only if the net benefit to the executive of remaining with the firm exceeds the net benefit associated with the next best use of the executive's time. Note that it is important to consider a broad definition of "benefits" here, as non-CEO executives presumably consider career prospects, work conditions, other jobrelated benefits, and the value of leisure in addition to current wages when making labor supply choices. Similarly, a firm will retain a given non-CEO executive if and only if the net benefit from doing so exceeds the net benefit associated with hiring the next best alternative executive.
Again, the notion of the "benefits" a firm receives should be construed rather broadly; a firm's actions vis a vis any particular manager are likely to affect its reputation in the managerial labor market, and employment decisions are likely to reflect this fact.
Thus, to think about how CEO turnover is related to non-CEO turnover, we ask how CEO turnover is related to the mutual gains from continued employment for non-CEOs. If departure of a CEO is associated with a reduction in the benefits a non-CEO receives from his job, or an increase in the value of the non-CEO's next best employment opportunity, then we expect CEO turnover to be related to increased rates of non-CEO turnover. Similarly, if CEO turnover is associated with a reduction in the value to the firm of continuing to employ a particular manager, or an increase in the value associated with hiring the best alternative manager, then CEO turnover should be related to higher rates of non-CEO turnover.
We proceed by identifying three reasons why CEO turnover may be associated with changes in the net benefits of continued employment for non-CEO managers.
Correlated Signals of Managerial Performance
CEO and non-CEO turnover may be associated if boards of directors receive positively correlated signals regarding managerial performance. Consider, for example, a setting where a board and a CEO are symmetrically uninformed regarding the CEO's ability at the time of hiring. 2
The board uses firm-performance related information to make inferences regarding ability, and fires the CEO if its belief as to the manager's ability falls below some critical level at which 2 Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) apply this assumption, and justify it by arguing that it is the match between an executive's skills and the firm's needs that determines productivity, and that the quality of this match is unknown to both parties at the time of hiring. 5 the board prefers to hire the best alternative manager. 3 Now consider enriching this setup so that boards make inferences regarding the abilities of CEOs and non-CEOs. If signals used to make such inferences are positively correlated (as would be the case if firm performance is used to assess both CEO and non-CEO performance), then net benefits to the firm of retaining any non-CEO manager are likely to be low around times of CEO turnover. 4
The first implication of this hypothesis, therefore, is that if performance signals of CEO and non-CEO managers are positively correlated, then CEO and non-CEO turnover should be positively related. As such signals become more positively correlated, then turnover events should be more closely associated. This may imply, for example, that turnover among highranking non-CEO managers may be more closely associated with CEO turnover compared to turnover among low-ranking non-CEO managers. This reasoning also suggests the CEO/non-CEO turnover association should be stronger when firm performance is poor. Consider a CEO who departs when firm performance is good -at this firm, performance is not leading board members to reduce their estimates of non-CEOs' abilities, so this instance of CEO turnover should not be associated with increased likelihood of non-CEO turnover.
Further, non-CEO turnover should be more closely related to CEO turnover when the departing CEO is not of retirement age, as retirement-age CEO turnovers are less likely to be indicative of boards' assessments of CEO ability or effort. 5 This reasoning may also suggest 3 Models of ability-based firing typically assume nominal downward wage rigidity, so wages cannot be adjusted downward to match productivity.
4 Similar conclusions can be obtained from agency-based models of CEO turnover. Jensen and Murphy (1990) , for example, suggest that termination can be used to provide incentives to top managers. In a model of agencybased firing, boards use firm performance to make inferences regarding the CEO's actions and commit to fire the CEO if it appears the CEO has not been acting to further shareholders' interests. If similar information is used to make inferences regarding actions of non-CEOs, CEO and non-CEO turnover should be positively related.
5 Clearly, not all CEOs who depart at age 65 "retire" and some CEOs do retire at ages other than 65. However, it is well established (see, for example, Weisbach (1988) , Barro and Barro (1990) and our own Table 4 , below) that rates of CEO turnover increase markedly when the CEO is aged 64 to 66. Hence, we expect that a selection of non-retirement-age turnovers are more likely to be indicative of boards' assessment of CEO effort or ability as compared to a selection of retirement-age turnovers. We discuss the implications of our imperfect that non-CEO turnover should be more closely associated with CEO turnover when the new CEO comes from outside the firm. If the new CEO comes from outside the firm, then the board of directors has presumably decided not to promote one of the internal non-CEO managers.
Conditional on observing outside succession, it is therefore relatively likely that the board of directors has a low estimate of non-CEO ability, and thus relatively likely that non-CEO managers will depart. Finally, we expect the association between CEO and non-CEO turnover to persist only if firm performance remains poor. Suppose a CEO departs after a period of poor firm-level performance, but some non-CEO managers are retained. If the firm continues to perform poorly, then the board will presumably continue to revise its estimates of non-CEO abilities downward. CEO turnover followed by continued poor performance should lead to additional departures of non-CEO managers. If, on the other hand, the firm begins to perform better, then estimates of these abilities will be revised upward, and subsequent rates of non-CEO departures should not be abnormally high.
Option Value in Promotion Tournaments
CEO and non-CEO turnover may be associated if, as suggested by Lazear and Rosen (1981) , firms use promotion tournaments to provide incentives for non-CEO managers. Rosen (1986) argues that the option value of future promotion opportunities is an important part of compensation for non-CEO managers. To be more specific, the value to a non-CEO of remaining with his current employer consists of both current compensation and expected future compensation.
If the manager believes there is some chance that he will be promoted to CEO, then, given the large wage differentials commonly found between CEO and non-CEO managers, the value associated with this potential promotion can be very large. CEO departure and the subsequent naming of a different manager to the CEO position can therefore reduce the net benefit to a non-CEO of remaining at the current firm; this argument thus suggests a positive association between CEO and non-CEO turnover (conditional on the non-CEO not being named to replace the departing CEO). 6 This reasoning also suggests that if high-ranking non-CEOs are measure of retirements for our empirical analysis below. more likely than low-ranking non-CEOs to be potential successors for an outgoing CEO, then turnover among high-ranking non-CEOs should be more greatly affected by CEO turnover than turnover among low-ranking non-CEOs. 7
Note also that this argument does not suggest that the CEO/non-CEO turnover link should be affected by firm performance, or by whether the departing CEO is of retirement age. To see this, consider one firm where the CEO departs after a period of poor performance and another firm where the CEO departs after a period of good performance. Assuming the CEO/non-CEO wage differentials are comparable at the two firms, the magnitude of lost promotion opportunities, and hence the reduction in job-related benefits to passed-over non-CEO managers, should be comparable at the two firms. This lost-promotion-opportunities effect is therefore the same regardless of whether firm performance is good or bad.
The potential effect of outside CEO turnover is, under the promotion-tournament hypothesis, somewhat more complex. If outside CEO turnover signals that the firm is less willing to promote from within in the future, then values of future promotion opportunities for non-CEOs may fall farther when an outsider is selected as CEO, suggesting that outside succession may be associated with higher rates of non-CEO turnover as compared to inside succession. However, given that CEOs spend, on average, ten years in the position, this effect should be important for only those non-CEO managers who may still be with the firm at the time the next CEO is chosen. 8 While we do not observe the ages of non-CEO managers (for reasons discussed below), it may be reasonable to assume that outside succession affects the promotion-based option departure. If, for example, a CEO names a successor some years in advance of his departure, then non-CEO managers who are not named as successor may be more likely to depart in the years prior to CEO turnover.
We examined this possibility by looking at non-CEO turnover at firms where the CEO was two to four years away from the standard retirement age, but could find no effect.
7 The assertion that high-ranking non-CEOs are more likely to be successors for CEOs is borne out in our data.
In our ExecuComp sample, for example, 508 of 670 inside successors we identify hold the title President, COO or CFO prior to becoming CEO.
8 Incentive effects of future promotion opportunities do appear to figure in corporate decision making. In Vancil (1987) , Don Perkins explains why he announced early in his tenure as Jewel Cos. CEO that he would serve for just ten years, even though he was only 43 years old when he took the job. His stated reason was to avoid "discouraging" younger executives who aspired to hold the top post (p. 72).
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value of low-ranking non-CEOs differently from that of high-ranking non-CEOs. Finally, this argument suggests the CEO/non-CEO turnover link should persist over the following year if passed-over non-CEOs take some time to find good outside opportunities.
Value of "Co-Worker-Specific" Human Capital
Much recent research in economics has attempted to extend human capital theory to account for the value gained from investments in relationships with others. Since Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) , economists have understood the value of repeated relationships in facilitating trust and cooperation, and more recent models emphasize the importance of investments that allow individuals to pursue group aims in the future. Rob and Zemsky (2002) , for example, study a model in which workers choose how to allocate their time between individual-based and cooperative activities. Pursuing cooperative or group activities builds a stock of "social capital," which facilitates the pursuit of group activities in the future. 9 In their model, firms offering strong rewards for individual-based achievement may deplete employees' stock of such capital. We hypothesize that time and effort must be expended to develop trust, communication and cooperation among members of a management team; if this is the case, then this time and effort can be viewed as an investment that builds a stock of relationship-specific human capital. 10 If a non-CEO executive has invested in a valuable working relationship that is specific to a particular CEO, then the value of that relationship is lost when that CEO departs. This reduces the mutual gains from continuing the employment relationship, and suggests that non-CEO and CEO turnover should be positively related. This argument also suggests that the CEO/non-CEO turnover link should be unaffected by contemporaneous firm performance and by whether the departing CEO is of retirement age.
Under this hypothesis, whatever the reason for CEO departure, the value of non-CEOs' CEOspecific investments still falls when the CEO departs. Further, the CEO/non-CEO turnover link should be stronger for high-ranking non-CEOs, as these employees may, on average, have closer working relationships with CEOs. The CEO/non-CEO turnover link should also be affected, under the hypothesis that managers invest in working relationships with each other, by whether the new CEO is an insider or an outsider. Non-CEO managers would presumably have already been able to make some investments in relationships with inside replacements, but not with new CEOs coming from outside. Thus, the value of non-CEOs' co-worker-specific human capital should be higher for inside succession, suggesting higher gains from continuing the employment relationship. 12 Finally, this argument also suggests the link between CEO and non-CEO turnover should be somewhat persistent; it may take some years after CEO turnover for non-CEOs' co-worker-specific human capital to return to pre-CEO-turnover levels.
We emphasize that our discussion here is not meant to imply that these explanations are mutually exclusive. For example, it is certainly possible that employees make investments that are specific to each other and that firms use positively correlated performance signals to make inferences about ability. In our empirical analysis below, we use the fact that these arguments offer somewhat different implications (summarized in Table 1 ) to attempt to identify which factors are important determinants of links between CEO and non-CEO turnover.
Description of Data
We make use of two distinct data sources in our empirical analysis. The first, Compustat's ExecuComp, is a panel data set consisting of detailed information on executive compensation a different community. Our notion of co-worker-specific human capital here is somewhat similar, in that we hypothesize that job mobility (by either the individual making the investment or the other party to the relationship) reduces the value of such investments.
12 Similar implications can be taken from a setting in which non-CEO managers make investments in skills that are specific to the particular strategy chosen by the CEO. We discuss this point in additional detail in Section 4.4. employees and more than $14 billion in assets, the median bank in our banks-only data set has only 257 employees and $670 million in assets.
The U.S. banking industry fits our research aims well. There is a large number of banks and thrifts in the U.S., and many of these are publicly traded and hence subject to rules regarding the disclosure of compensation figures for top executives. Also, as illustrated in Parrino's (1997) cross-sectional analysis of outside succession, depository institutions are relatively likely to replace top managers with outsiders. Hence, this industry is likely to yield a large number of CEO turnover events, with a relatively large number of the resulting vacancies filled by outsiders.
The source of our bank data is a set of Executive Compensation Reviews published by SNL Securities, a research firm specializing in depository institutions. Each year throughout the 1990s, SNL gathered proxy disclosures from all publicly traded U.S. banks and thrifts, and compiled this information into separate books for thrift institutions and for banks. These books contain information regarding both executive compensation and firm performance. We obtained the 1990 through 1999 Compensation Reviews for both banks and thrifts, and compiled this information into a panel data set. 13
The indirect source for both the ExecuComp and SNL data is firms' proxy statements.
Throughout our sample periods, firms were required to disclose the identity and pay of the highest-paid employee and, if pay exceeded a minimum threshold, the next four most highly paid employees; consequently, proxy statements provide a snapshot of the identities and pay levels of each firm's top executives at a given point in time. We use the term "disclosure group" to refer to the set of managers whose pay is disclosed by a firm in a given year. SEC rules regarding both the pay thresholds and the nature of the required compensation disclosure changed in 1993. Prior to this change, firms were required to disclose compensation information for the second through fifth most highly paid employees only if these employees earned more than $60,000. For 1993 and subsequent years, the pay threshold for the second through fifth managers was set at $100,000. For a significant fraction of the firm-years in our two samples, this minimum threshold binds and the proxy fewer than five executives. To facilitate comparability of the pre-and post-1993 samples, we drop pre-1993 non-CEO managers who earned less than $100,000 from the SNL data.
Both data sources also offer firm-level information. From ExecuComp, we take assets, number of employees, return on assets, stock return, and two digit SIC industry. For the full SNL sample, we have total assets and return on assets. Because SNL expanded its reporting conventions after 1992, we obtain a richer set of firm-level variables for the post-1992 observations, including number of employees and stock return. We augment this data with pre-1992 stock returns taken from CRSP. Panels A and B of The two data sources differ somewhat in the executive-level information offered. ExecuComp lists extremely detailed compensation information, including annual compensation amounts, stock holdings, value of restricted stock holdings, and value of stock options. ExecuComp also identifies a CEO for each firm, gives ages for most CEOs, and lists the "title" reported in the proxy statement for each executive. We augment CEO age information by hand-collecting ages from the SEC's EDGAR web page or from 10kwizard.com. Using the reported titles, we break the set of non-CEO executives into two categories by rank. We designate any executive holding the title "President" (of the company, not of a subsidiary), "Chief Operating Officer" or "Chief 14 The median stock return for firm-years in our SNL sample is a somewhat high 29.5%. We have double-checked this figure using both the returns data from CRSP and returns figures we obtained directly from SNL. In addition, we hand-checked returns for a subset of our sample firms. It appears banks simply performed quite well during the 1990s. To limit the potential effect of outliers in our data, we drop the lowest and highest 1% of market and and accounting returns. Inclusion of these firms in our analysis has no qualitative effect on our findings.
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Financial Officer" as a "high-ranking" non-CEO officer. Any non-CEO that does not hold one of these titles is designated a "low-ranking" non-CEO.
SNL's offering of compensation information is somewhat less comprehensive. SNL offers annual compensation amounts and (for post-1993 observations) value of option holdings. However, SNL's Compensation Review books do not offer any information on share ownership or holdings of restricted stock. In addition, SNL's books contain no information on CEO ages, so we hand-collect this information. As additional executive-level information, SNL lists both a "title" and "position" for each executive. A manager's title is what the firm reports in the proxy statement, while his position is SNL's attempt to standardize the reported titles so as to facilitate inter-firm comparisons in pay levels. To attach positions to each executive, SNL surveys the firms regarding the responsibilities assigned to each listed executive. There are twelve position categories into which executives are partitioned, including CEO, COO, and CFO. We partition the non-CEO executives into two groups using SNL's positions. COOs and
CFOs are designated as "high-ranking," while other non-CEO executives are "low-ranking." 15
In both samples, we define, for each executive-year, a turnover variable to take value one if that executive is not listed in the firm's disclosure group in the following year, and zero otherwise.
We present summary statistics for the executive-level variables from the ExecuComp and SNL samples in Panels A and B, respectively, of Table 3 . 16 Since both our data sources are shaped by the SEC's disclosure rules regarding compensation amounts, the resulting sample is, in some respects, less than ideal for our purposes. For example, 15 Note here that our two data sources have offsetting strengths and weaknesses. While we would prefer to have more detailed information from SNL on executive shareholdings, ExecuComp provides very detailed information on this dimension. Similarly, we would prefer not to have to determine ourselves what an appropriate criterion for defining "high-ranking" non-CEOs; SNL's "position" datum partially alleviates this concern in the banks sample. Hence, we view our two data sets as complementing each other, with each mitigating a potential weakness of the other.
16 Note that the definition of turnover applied in Table 3 is different from that typically found in research focusing on turnover in the CEO position. While work on CEOs reports the rate at which CEOs leave the CEO position, we report the rate at which CEOs leave the firm's disclosure group. The rates at which CEOs leave the CEO position are 11.7% and 7.7% in the ExecuComp and SNL samples, respectively, figures that are comparable to those found in the CEO turnover literature. we would like to observe the age of non-CEO managers. A large number of the non-CEO turnover events in our sample are undoubtedly retirements, and, as we noted in footnote 5, many studies of CEO turnover report higher departure probabilities for managers near retirement age.
However, firms are not required to list the ages of non-CEO managers. 17 Our study shares this data limitation with most other work on employment outcomes for non-CEO executives (for example, Blackwell, Brickley and Weisbach (1994) and Kaplan (1994b) ), and we discuss the potential effects of this limitation on our findings below. We would also prefer to be able to identify the reasons underlying executive departure so as to distinguish various forms of turnover. While a number of studies of CEO turnover have attempted to identify causes of turnover by examining press accounts (see, for example, Warner et al. (1988) and Engel, Hayes and Wang (2002) ), the value of such an approach is more limited here because it is not standard practice for firms to issue press releases regarding departures of non-CEO executives. Hence, the set of non-CEO departures announced in the business press would likely not be a random selection of departures. Also, a large number of the firms in our samples (especially the SNL sample) are too small to be covered by the national business press. Finally, we would also like to observe the destinations of managers leaving each firm's disclosure group. Given the SEC's disclosure rules, it is possible that an executive may drop out of a firm's compensation disclosure but still remain an employee of the firm. We attempt to control for disclosure-group changes that are unrelated to changes in the actual composition of top management teams in a variety of ways and discuss these below.
Analysis
In this section, we first describe our empirical strategy, placing particular emphasis on developing the link between changes in firms' disclosure groups (which is what we observe) and changes in firms' top management teams (which is the economic phenomenon of interest). We then present the results from estimation of a series of models in which we allow the probability of disclosure group departure to depend on firm performance and CEO changes. Finally, we examine the association between disclosure group departure and subsequent organizational changes.
Empirical Strategy
As we noted above, data limitations yield a sample that is, in some respects, less than ideal for our purposes. While our main interest is in studying changes in firms' top management teams,
we can observe only year-to-year changes in the firms' disclosure groups. It is important, therefore, for us to be clear about what we are able to measure, and why we believe this measurement exercise sheds light on the factors affecting changes in firms' top management teams.
Given our observation of year-to-year changes in the composition of firms' disclosure groups, we can measure how the probability an executive leaves his firm's disclosure group varies with firm performance and CEO succession. To do this, we estimate a series of logit models where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a manager departed the disclosure group in a given year. 18 For executive i listed in firm j's year t compensation disclosure, we define disclosure-group departure (DG Departure) as follows: For cases where an executive leaves the firm, the link between our measure and changes in the composition of top management teams is clear. Responsibilities previously allocated to the departing manager must be parsed out among those who remain. For cases where the executive 18 An alternative approach would be to let the firm-year, rather than the executive-year, be the unit of observation. In an earlier version of this paper, we pursued this alternative using an ordered logit specification to relate CEO turnover to the number of non-CEO managers who leave the firm's disclosure group. We obtained qualitatively similar results.
remains with the firm but falls out of the disclosure group, the link to changes in the top management team is somewhat less clear. Certainly, if the fifth-highest-paid manager falls out of the disclosure group because a highly paid outsider is brought in as COO or CFO, then this change in the composition of the disclosure group will be indicative of a change in the identities of the firm's top decision makers. If, on the other hand, the fifth-highest-paid manager falls out of the disclosure group because the sixth-highest-paid manager receives a slightly larger raise than the fifth-highest, then the change in the disclosure group is likely not indicative of any important change in the top management team.
Our empirical strategy is to use a large number of observable characteristics of the firm and the non-CEO manager to control for the "normal" rate at which managers depart the disclosure group. If we find that the rate at which managers depart the disclosure group is higher when the firm's performance is bad or when there has been a recent CEO change, then we can conclude that different forces act on the composition of disclosure groups at these times.
Under the assumption that, conditional on our control variables, the rate at which managers depart for reasons unrelated to changes in the top management teams does not depend on firm performance or CEO turnover, then we can also conclude that poor performance and CEO turnover are associated with changes in top management teams.
Since we know the criteria for disclosure of pay levels, it is straightforward to devise control variables to pick up the normal rate at which managers depart the disclosure group but remain with the firm. For example, conditional on remaining with the firm, it is somewhat likely that a firm's fifth-highest-paid manager in year t will not be among the five highest-paid managers in year t + 1. However, conditional on the second-highest-paid manager remaining with the firm, it is probably more likely that this manager will remain in the top five. Hence, we condition the baseline rate of disclosure-group departure on year t compensation rank by including indicator variables for the executive's compensation rank.
The likelihood that an executive departs the year t + 1 disclosure group conditional on remaining with the firm is presumably also related to the difference between that executive's pay and that of the lowest paid executive listed by his firm. For example, consider one firm where the year t second-highest-paid executive makes $200,000 more than the fifth-highest, and another firm where this second-fifth difference is only $10,000. We might expect the first firm's second-highest-paid executive to be less likely to fall out of the disclosure group in year t + 1.
We define a series of indicator variables called CUT x−5,x to take value one if the executive's compensation is between x − 5 and x percent greater than the compensation of the firm's lowest-paid listed executive. We define twelve such indicators by allowing x to take values in increments of five from five up to sixty. For firms disclosing the pay of less than five executives, an executive can fall out of the disclosure group if his pay dips below $100,000. Hence, we define another set of indicators CUT100 x−5,x to take value one if the executive's compensation is between x − 5 and x percent greater than $100,000 (again letting x go from five to sixty in increments of five). We set CUT x−5,x (for all x) to zero for firms disclosing four or fewer executives, and CUT100 x−5,x to zero for firms disclosing five. As an additional control for firms disclosing fewer than five executives, we include indicator variables for the number of executives whose pay is disclosed by executive i's employer in year t.
We also observe that firms making significant acquisitions often retain some or all of the top managers of the acquired firm. If the highly paid CEO of an acquired firm remains with the acquirer after the merger, then the acquirer's fifth-highest-paid executive prior to the merger is presumably more likely to fall out of the disclosure group. (Clearly, some manager must fall out of the disclosure group in this event.) Hence, in each of our samples, we set an indicator variable BUY t equal to one if the firm completed an acquisition in year t−1 and zero otherwise.
In our ExecuComp sample, we construct this variable by using the SDC Platinum database to identify all acquisitions made by our sample firms with purchase price greater than $100 million.
For our banks sample, we construct this measure by tracking each bank that leaves our sample to determine if it was acquired by another of our sample firms. Because our sample covers all publicly traded banks and thrifts, and because restrictions on non-banking activities cause banks to acquire non-banks very infrequently, we believe this approach captures most acquisitions made by our sample firms. 19 To allow the probability of disclosure group departure conditional 19 We do not observe cases where a sample bank buys and retains the top manager of a privately held bank.
On the theory that firms we observe making acquisitions may also be more likely to make acquisitions we do not observe, we broadened our acquisition variables by defining indicator for whether the firm undertook any acquisitions during the sample period. Specifically, for each firm we defined EVERBUY = maxt BUYt. Use of this variable yields qualitatively similar results.
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on an acquisition to vary with rank, we interact BUY with the compensation rank indicators. As additional merger-related controls, we include the firm's change in log assets, and interactions between change in log assets and compensation rank. We also include firm size (as measured by log assets), and year indicators. In our ExecuComp sample, we also include two-digit industry fixed effects, the executive's fractional share ownership, the value of his unexercisable stock options, and the value of his restricted stock holdings. 20 In our SNL sample, we include an indicator for whether the firm is a thrift institution and thrift-year interactions.
Determinants of Disclosure-Group Departure for Non-CEO Managers
We begin by describing the basic effects of performance on disclosure group departure for non-CEO managers, as well as how departure and the effect of performance on turnover differ by position rank. We perform a series of logit regressions relating departure from the firm's disclosure group to firm performance and a variety of control variables.
We first consider determinants of CEO departure. As the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance has been studied extensively, this exercise is intended primarily as a check on the comparability of our sample to prior work. In Columns (1) and (4) of Table 4 , we present logit models where the dependent variables indicate whether the CEO departed the firm's disclosure group. 21 Coefficients estimated by logit models are difficult to interpret economically, so we instead present the marginal effect of a change in each of the independent variables on the probability of disclosure group departure, computed at the sample mean of all independent variables. For dummy variables, we present the predicted increase in the probability of departure 20 Executives holding substantial amounts of unvested compensation, such as that associated with unexercisable options or restricted stock, may find it quite costly to leave the firm. However, any inference about the relationship between unvested compensation and subsequent turnover is clouded by the obvious endogeneity of such grants. A non-CEO executive with outstanding outside job opportunities may receive large deferred compensation grants, but may still be more likely to leave the firm than a non-CEO executive with no deferred compensation and poor outside job opportunities. See Oyer (2002) for a justification for why firms would use equity-based instruments (as opposed to non-equity-based instruments) for retention purposes.
when the dummy increases from zero to one.
As expected, results indicate that CEOs are more likely to leave the disclosure group when firm performance is poor. In the ExecuComp sample, firm performance variables are negative and significant at far better than the 1% level. The coefficient on ROA is -0.0013, which implies that each ten-percentage-point reduction in ROA is associated with an increase of 1.3
percentage points in the likelihood of CEO disclosure group departure. Recall from Table 2 CEOs who are past retirement age are also more likely to turn over, by 2.9 (2.7) percentage points, compared to those aged less than 64. As the unconditional rate of CEO turnover is 5.8% (3.3%), the likelihood of turnover nearly doubles when the CEO is near the standard retirement age. A CEO is also less likely to depart the disclosure group when he holds a larger share of the firm's equity.
In Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6), we examine determinants of disclosure group departure for non-CEO managers. As with the CEOs, accounting and market measures of firm performance are significant in the ExecuComp sample, and somewhat less so in the SNL sample. Notably, the marginal effects of firm performance on non-CEO disclosure group-departure are greater in magnitude than the effects for CEO disclosure group departure. However, when computed as a fraction of the unconditional likelihood of departure, the effect of performance on non-CEO disclosure group departure is less strong than for CEOs. To demonstrate, note that in our Recall that, like other work on employment outcomes for non-CEO managers, we are unable to gather information regarding the ages of such managers. As a simple check of the effect of omitted age data, we estimated the CEO departure model without the CEO age variable. While our point estimates became somewhat less precise, they remained very similar in magnitude.
This suggests that CEO age is not highly correlated with our other explanatory variables. It is perhaps reasonable to expect that ages of non-CEO managers would be even less correlated with other explanatory variables than CEO age, given the fact that a CEO's decisions presumably have greater impact on the firm. Hence, we do not expect omission of non-CEO age to have significant effects on our estimates other than reducing their precision.
For brevity, we omit from the table a number of variables intended to control for the "normal" rate at which managers leave the disclosure group. We report, however, that these variables behave much as one might expect. Consider, for example, the regression in Column (2).
A non-CEO manager whose pay is within five log points of the $100,000 threshold is more likely by 17.4 percentage points to depart the disclosure group, as compared to the omitted category of managers with pay more than sixty log points higher than $100,000. The coefficients on the CUT100 variables are significantly different from zero up to thirty log points above $100,000.
Similarly, a non-CEO manager whose pay is within five log points of the lowest paid manager in his firm's disclosure group is more likely to depart by 4.1 percentage points, as compared to the omitted category. The coefficients on the CUT variables are significantly positive up to 35 log points above the lowest paid executive's pay. The coefficients on the rank dummies are monotone, with the fifth-highest-paid executive significantly more likely (by about five percentage points) to leave the disclosure group than the second-highest.
CEO Succession and Turnover of Non-CEO Managers
We next examine the association between changes at the CEO position and both concurrent and subsequent changes at lower levels in the top management team. We start by showing that a CEO change significantly increases the likelihood that other top executives will depart the disclosure group. We then decompose this effect into a general CEO turnover effect, the effect of "non-routine" CEO changes, and the effect of outside succession.
In Table 5 , we present results of logit regressions similar to those in Table 4 , but including a number of variables relating to whether the firm's CEO relinquished that position prior to the following year's proxy disclosure. These regressions include all controls from those in Table 4 and also include an indicator for whether executive i became the firm's CEO in year t+1. Since an executive who takes over as CEO necessarily remains in the disclosure group, inclusion of this indicator has the same effect as dropping those executives who take over as CEO. Hence, the correct interpretation of the estimates in Table 5 is as follows: how is the likelihood of executive i's departure from the disclosure group affected by CEO turnover, conditional on executive i not becoming the new CEO?
Results indicate that CEO turnover has a large and significant effect on the probability that other executives will depart the disclosure group. As shown in the first column, CEO turnover increases the probability of a disclosure group departure for high-ranking non-CEOs in the ExecuComp sample by 12.8 percentage points. As the unconditional likelihood of departure among this group is 10.4%, this represents more than a doubling of the likelihood of departure.
This estimate is significant at far better than the 1% level. For ExecuComp low-ranking nonCEOs, CEO turnover increases the likelihood of departure by 5.5 percentage points. Columns (5) and (7) show effects of 4.3 and 5.8 percentage points for SNL high-and low-ranking nonCEOs. The finding that CEO turnover is related to non-CEO disclosure group departure is consistent with each of the theories we discussed in Section 2.
In Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8), we allow the effect of CEO turnover on non-CEO departure to vary with firm performance. Overall, we find little evidence to suggest that the association Dependent variable is an indicator for whether executive leaves disclosure group. Parameters are estimates of the marginal effect on the probability of departure of an increase in the independent variable. For dummy variables, parameter is the estimated increase in probability of departure when dummy increases from zero to one. Robust asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include log assets, change in log assets, and indicator variables for year, proximity to disclosure group cutoff, compensation rank, number of executives in disclosure group, and acquisition. Also included are interactions between rank and acquisition, and rank and change in log assets. ExecuComp regressions include 2-digit industry fixed effects. SNL regressions include a thrift indicator and thrift/year interactions. Dependent variable is an indicator for whether executive departs firm's disclosure group. Parameters are estimates of the marginal effect on the probability of departure of an increase in the independent variable. For dummy variables, parameter is the estimated increase in probability of departure when dummy increases from zero to one. Robust asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include log assets, change in log assets, and indicator variables for year, proximity to disclosure group cutoff, compensation rank, number of executives in disclosure group, and acquisition. Also included are interactions between rank and acquisition, and rank and change in log assets. ExecuComp regressions include 2-digit industry fixed effects and fraction ownership, value of unexercised option holdings, and value of restricted stock holdings. SNL regressions include a thrift indicator and thrift/year interactions.
26
between CEO and non-CEO departure is affected by firm performance. For ExecuComp highranking non-CEOs, we obtain negative coefficients on CEO Turn t * ROA t and CEO Turn t * RET t , but neither is statistically significant. In addition, a test of the joint significance of the coefficients does not reject the null. The coefficient on CEO Turn t * ROA t is significant at the 10% level for SNL low-ranking executives, but the coefficient on CEO Turn t * RET t takes a positive (but insignificant) value. A test of the joint significance of the two coefficients does not reject the null. We obtain somewhat puzzling results for the SNL high-ranking sample; estimates suggest that CEO turnover is more likely to result in non-CEO departure when accounting performance is good. Again, however, the hypothesis that both interaction coefficients are zero is not rejected. Referring back to Table 1 , we note that under the hypothesis that correlated signals of managerial performance can explain the CEO/non-CEO departure link, then we would expect to find this link to be stronger when firm performance is bad. Hence, we take the results from Table 5 as evidence that correlation of performance signals for top managers does not offer a compelling explanation for patterns in CEO and non-CEO departure.
We examine this result in more detail by decomposing the effect of CEO turnover on departure of non-CEO managers. We ask whether departure of non-CEOs around times of CEO turnover is related to the age of the departing CEO or the origin of the new CEO (inside vs. outside). We define a new CEO to be an "outsider" if he was not listed in that firm's disclosure group in the year prior to taking over as CEO. We define CEO turnover to be a non-retirement if the departing CEO is not of standard retirement age (which we take to be between 64 and 66). Our intent here is to distinguish between "normal" CEO succession (where a retiring CEO is succeeded by an internal candidate) and "abnormal" succession events. The Outside t and Non-Retire t variables identify cases where the CEO is not at or past retirement age at the time of succession, and cases where the successor is not chosen from among internal candidates. Of course, neither of these measures is perfect. Many executives retire at ages other than 65, and succession can be perfectly routine for such managers. Similarly, our outsider variable could be mismeasured if a manager that was ranked sixth or lower in compensation (or who made less than $100,000 in the previous year) is promoted to CEO. 23 If some "normal" retirements or inside successions are placed in our outsider or non-retirement groups, then we expect our coefficients measuring the retire/non-retire and insider/outsider differences to underestimate the true effect.
In Table 6 we present logit regressions including the Outside t and Non-Retire t variables.
We apply all control variables used in Table 5 , but add an indicator for whether the former CEO remains in the disclosure group following an outside succession. This variable controls for the fact that the combination of a new CEO from outside and the old CEO remaining would mechanically increase our turnover measure. Results show the Outside t variable to have a strong effect. In each of the eight specifications reported, the outsider effect is economically large and statistically significant. Outside CEO turnover increases the likelihood of non-CEO departure from between 5.5 percentage points (in the ExecuComp high-ranking non-CEO sample) to 16.7 percentage points (in the SNL low-ranking non-CEO sample). 24 Throughout this table and in many unreported specifications, this outsider effect proves very robust. It is positive, statistically significant, and large (in economic terms) in all the specifications we estimated. 25
Comparing the coefficients on CEO Turn t and Non-Retire t across the sub-samples yields some additional insights. For example, there is clear evidence suggesting that the impact of
Since only 2% of internally promoted CEOs ranked fifth, we expect few (if any) future CEOs ranked sixth or lower in the previous year.
24 Note that if, for some reason, our data-gathering process mismatched some firms from year to year, then our data would show whole teams of executives turning over simultaneously. Such turnover would be correlated with CEO turnover and, especially, outside CEO succession. To insure such coding errors are not driving our results, we reran our analysis without firm-years that showed complete disclosure-group turnover. This did not have a substantial effect on our results.
25 The finding that the coefficients on firm performance remain negative and significant in Table 6 is the only result in our paper that conflicts with Fee and Hadlock (2002) . When they control for CEO firing and outside succession, they find that the effect of performance (stock return in their analysis) is negligible. It is unlikely that this results from differences in dependent variables (we use all turnovers while they look at firings only), as the sensitivity of firings to firm performance is likely to be higher than the sensitivity of turnover more
generally. It appears, therefore, that non-CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm performance, controlling for CEO turnover, at firms that are not large enough to be included in the S&P 500 (and, therefore, Fee and Hadlock's (2002) sample).
retirements on non-CEO departure differs according to the rank of the non-CEO manager.
Consider, for example, a CEO aged 64 to 66 who leaves the CEO position and is replaced by an insider. The coefficient on CEO Turn t in Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) is an estimate of the change in the probability of non-CEO departure around such events. For the ExecuComp sample, results indicate that high-ranking non-CEOs are more likely to depart the disclosure group around CEO retirements with inside succession. The point estimate suggests that the likelihood of high-ranking non-CEO departure more than doubles around such events, and this point estimate is significant at far better than the 1% level. For low-ranking non-CEO managers, however, we find the opposite. Such managers are substantially less likely to depart the disclosure group around CEO retirements. The SNL data show a similar pattern of greater responsiveness of high-ranking non-CEO departure to CEO retirements, although the differences there are not significant. Notably, the Non-Retire t variable has very little effect on our analysis.
For the ExecuComp high-ranking and both SNL samples, the coefficient estimates are not significantly different from zero, which suggests that the effect of internal successions on non-CEO turnover is not impacted by whether the departing CEO was of retirement age. We do obtain a positive coefficient in the ExecuComp low-ranking non-CEO sample. Combining this coefficient with that on CEO Turn t , we conclude that low-ranking non-CEOs are no more likely to depart the disclosure group around inside succession of a non-retirement aged CEO as compared to times of no CEO turnover. 26 We next expand our analysis to include CEO turnover in the prior year as an explanatory variable. This specification allows us to inquire whether the increased propensity of non-CEO executives to depart the disclosure group around times of CEO turnover is transitory, or if nonCEOs remain likely to depart in the years just after CEO succession. In Table 7 , we restrict the sample to include only executives who are listed in the firm's disclosure for at least years t − 1 and t and ask how the probability of non-CEO turnover in the current year is affected by CEO turnover in the previous year. If non-CEO departure occurs primarily in the year of CEO turnover and then drops off, then we should expect the marginal effect of CEO Turn t−1 to be Dependent variable is an indicator for whether executive departs firm's disclosure group. Parameters are estimates of the marginal effect on the probability of departure of an increase in the independent variable. For dummy variables, parameter is the estimated increase in probability of departure when dummy increases from zero to one. Robust asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include change in log assets, and indicator variables for year, proximity to disclosure group cutoff, compensation rank, number of executives in disclosure group, whether departing CEO remains in disclosure group, and acquisition. Also included are interactions between rank and acquisition, and rank and change in log assets. ExecuComp regressions include 2-digit industry fixed effects and fraction ownership, value of unexercised option holdings, and value of restricted stock holdings. SNL regressions include a thrift indicator and thrift/year interactions. Dependent variable is an indicator for whether executive departs firm's disclosure group. Parameters are estimates of the marginal effect on the probability of departure of an increase in the independent variable. For dummy variables, parameter is the estimated increase in probability of departure when dummy increases from zero to one. Robust asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include change in log assets, and indicator variables for year, proximity to disclosure group cutoff, compensation rank, number of executives in disclosure group, and acquisition. Also included are interactions between rank and acquisition, and rank and change in log assets. ExecuComp regressions include 2-digit industry fixed effects and fraction ownership, value of unexercised option holdings, and value of restricted stock holdings. SNL regressions include a thrift indicator and thrift/year interactions.
close to zero. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) offer evidence to suggest the association between CEO turnover and non-CEO disclosure group departure is persistent. For example, a highranking non-CEO in the ExecuComp sample is 3.3 percentage points more likely to depart the disclosure group in year t if there was a CEO change in year t − 1. The estimated effects of lagged CEO turnover on departure for low-ranking non-CEOs are 9.5 and 13.3 percentage points for the ExecuComp and SNL samples, respectively. Curiously, these estimates are larger than the estimated effects for contemporaneous turnover, suggesting perhaps that new CEOs may shuffle top management teams in their first years in office. Only in the SNL high-ranking non-CEO group is this coefficient on lagged CEO turnover insignificant. 27
In Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8), we include lagged versions of our outside and non-retirement variables. 28 Results again indicate that outside CEO turnover drives nearly all of the association between CEO and non-CEO departure. In fact, each of the four CEO Turn t−1 variables becomes statistically insignificant in these specifications, suggesting that a year t − 1 retirement with inside succession does not increase the likelihood of year t non-CEO disclosure group departure.
The coefficients on Outside t−1 are all positive and significant (at better than the 1% level in
Columns (2), (4), and (6), and at the 10% level in Column (8)), and range from 7.0 to 9.7 percentage points. Interestingly, the results in Columns (4) and (8) imply that low-ranking non-CEO turnover is higher in the second year after an insider replaces a CEO who is not of retirement age.
We conclude this section by arguing that the pattern of associations between CEO and non-CEO departure appears most consistent with the hypothesis that non-CEO managers make significant investments in co-worker-specific human capital, and that the value of such investments is reduced when CEOs depart. Our analysis offers little evidence to suggest that the CEO/non-CEO departure link is affected by firm performance, or by whether the departing 27 We also interacted the date t − 1 CEO turnover indicator with date t firm performance variables to check whether the persistence of the CEO effect depends on on-going firm performance. Coefficients on these interaction variables were not significantly different from zero.
28 In Column (6), we are unable to include CEO Turnt−1 as an explanatory variable. In none of the 77 cases where a high-ranking non-CEO departed did a CEO aged 64 to 66 also depart. Hence, CEO Turnt−1 and Non-Retiret−1 cannot be separately identified.
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CEO is of retirement age. These findings lead us to dismiss the hypothesis discussed in Section 2.1 that boards' correlated signals of managerial ability can explain this link. Further, the finding that outside CEO turnover has a large impact on departure probabilities even for highranking non-CEO managers casts doubt on the tournament explanation considered in Section 2.2. Given that average CEO tenures are around ten years, a high-ranking non-CEO manager who is passed over for the CEO job would seem very unlikely to ever become the firm's CEO regardless of whether the new CEO is from inside the firm or outside. Hence, the reduction in job-related benefits to this employee stemming from lost option value of becoming CEO should not be affected by the prior employment of the CEO.
Executive Changes and Subsequent Organizational Changes
Our results above indicate that CEO turnover is associated with increased rates of concurrent and subsequent non-CEO turnover. Given prior research documenting links between CEO turnover and subsequent corporate restructurings (see, for example, Weisbach (1995) , Denis and Denis (1995) , Denis and Serrano (1996) , or Mulherin and Poulsen (1998) ) another natural question is whether turnover among non-CEO managers is associated with a greater incidence of organizational change. An answer to this question would shed light on the process of organizational change -if, for example, one found that non-CEO changes were strongly associated with subsequent organizational changes, then this may suggest such change is difficult to implement with a pre-existing management team. If, on the other hand, non-CEO changes do not appear to be associated with organizational change, then new CEOs may be able to effect change without replacing lower level managers, perhaps, as suggested by Wruck (2000) , by altering existing managers' performance measurement and reward systems.
An answer to this question may also shed light on the reasons underlying the link between CEO and non-CEO departure. In Section 2, we outlined a scenario in which the departure of a CEO reduces the value of non-CEO's co-worker-specific human capital. Another way in which human capital of non-CEOs may be affected by CEO departure is if non-CEOs invest in skills that are specific to the current CEO's approach to running the firm. If CEO departure results in subsequent changes in the firm's strategic direction, then non-CEOs' skills will be less highly valued after CEO departure. 29 One way to examine this possibility is to assess the link between non-CEO departure and subsequent organizational changes.
To address this question, we define three variables that we argue are potentially indicative of significant organizational changes. For each firm-year t in our data, we let an indicator variable Edrop5 t+1 take value one if the firm experiences an employment drop of 5% or more from the end of year t to the end of year t+1. Similarly, we let Adrop5 t+1 take value one if the firm experiences a reduction in assets of 5% or more in the subsequent year. We argue that reductions in assets and employment are likely to result from significant corporate restructurings, for example sales of divisions or large layoffs. Clearly, these variables are somewhat rough proxies for the incidence of significant organizational changes. A badly measured dependent variable, however, should present no problems for estimation other than reducing the precision of our estimates.
We are able to construct a better indicator of organizational change using a comprehensive list of layoff announcements at Fortune 500 firms constructed for Hallock's (1998) study of the association between layoff announcements and CEO pay. Billger and Hallock (2000) use this data to study the association between CEO turnover and layoffs. We match this layoff data to our ExecuComp sample, but note that the ExecuComp sample only partly overlaps with the Fortune 500. Hence, while the layoff announcement data has the advantage of being a more precise measure of subsequent organizational change than asset or employment drops, it also has the disadvantage of causing us to drop a large number of observations. We therefore incorporate both sets of measures into our analysis.
Taking these asset drop, employment drop and layoff indicators as dependent variables, we run a series of logit regressions taking the firm-year as the unit of observation. As explanatory variables, we use a series of year t firm performance and year t − 1 to t executive turnover variables. Hence, the question posed by our logit regression is the following: Conditional on year t firm performance, is the likelihood of year t to year t + 1 organizational changes related to the extent of executive team changes from year t − 1 to year t? As with other studies on links between executive turnover and organizational changes, we must be careful not to attempt to draw causal inferences from this analysis. Clearly, executive changes may be a direct result of shareholders' or boards' determination that organizational changes are needed. Hence, it is appropriate to interpret any connection between executive turnover and subsequent change as a mere association, rather than as causation. Nevertheless, this analysis clearly has the potential to offer insights regarding the process of organizational change.
As year t firm performance variables, we use return on assets and stock returns. Since the unit of observation here is the firm, we construct two new variables that reflect the extent of non-CEO top management changes. The variable Any non-CEO Turn t−1 takes value one if there is at least one non-CEO manager present in the firm's disclosure group in year t − 1 who is not present in the firm's disclosure group in year t. The variable Hi-Rank non-CEO Turn t−1 takes value one if there is at least one high-ranking non-CEO manager present in the firm's disclosure group in year t − 1 who is not present in the firm's disclosure group in year t. 30 We include our previously defined indicators for year t − 1 to t CEO turnover and outside CEO turnover.
Other controls include log assets at the end of year t, change in log assets from t − 1 to t, and year and industry (2-digit for ExecuComp, thrift for SNL) indicators.
We present results in Tables 8 through 10 . We begin, in Table 8 , by using Adrop5 t+1 as a dependent variable. Firm performance, as measured by market and accounting returns, are closely associated with subsequent asset drops. In the ExecuComp sample, for example, a one percentage point reduction in ROA increases the likelihood of a subsequent 5% asset drop by 1.2 percentage points. Columns (1) and (4) indicate that CEO Turn t−1 is positively related to subsequent asset drops as well. For the ExecuComp (SNL) sample, the coefficient estimate suggests that CEO turnover from year t − 1 to year t is associated with a 2.5 (1.5) percentage point increase in the likelihood of a year t to year t + 1 asset drop. These estimates are significant at the 12 and 9 percent levels, respectively. Consistent with prior research, we find outside CEO succession to be more closely associated with subsequent organizational 30 We adjust these indicators slightly by setting them to zero in two situations where non-CEO turnover actually occurred. First, if the number of executives listed in the firm's disclosure group fell from year t − 1 to t, then we reason that the non-CEO turnover may have been due to a wage reduction rather than actual executive departure. Second, if there was outside CEO turnover and the departing CEO remained in the disclosure group, then there is necessarily a non-CEO turnover which again is unlikely to be indicative of executive departure. Dependent variable is an indicator for 5% asset drop from the end of year t to the end of year t + 1. Parameters are estimates of the marginal effect on the probability of departure of an increase in the independent variable. For dummy variables, parameter is the estimated increase in probability of departure when dummy increases from zero to one. Robust asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Controls include year t assets and change in assets, and year indicators. ExecuComp regressions include 2-digit industry fixed effects. SNL regressions include a thrift indicator and thrift/year interactions. Dependent variable is an indicator for 5% employment drop from the end of year t to the end of year t + 1. Parameters are estimates of the marginal effect on the probability of departure of an increase in the independent variable. For dummy variables, parameter is the estimated increase in probability of departure when dummy increases from zero to one. Robust asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Controls include year t assets and change in assets, and year indicators. ExecuComp regressions include 2-digit industry fixed effects. SNL regressions include a thrift indicator and thrift/year interactions. Dependent variable is an indicator for whether the firm announced a layoff during year t + 1. Parameters are estimates of the marginal effect on the probability of departure of an increase in the independent variable. For dummy variables, parameter is the estimated increase in probability of departure when dummy increases from zero to one.
Robust asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Controls include year t assets and change in assets, and indicators for year and 2-digit industry.
38 changes (and significantly so in the SNL sample). Notably, the coefficients on all four non-CEO indicators are positive. With the exception of the SNL Any non-CEO Turn t−1 variable, all are significant at better than the 5% level. The parameter estimates indicate that non-CEO turnover is associated with an increase in the likelihood of subsequent organizational change of between 2.5 and 4.0 percentage points. 31 These results indicate that non-CEO disclosure group departure is even more closely related to subsequent asset reductions than is CEO turnover.
We obtain similar results in Table 9 using Edrop5 t+1 as a dependent variable. There is some evidence consistent with prior research showing a positive association between CEO changes and subsequent organizational changes. Again, we find that non-CEO changes are positively associated with subsequent organizational changes. Three of the four coefficients are significantly different from zero, and point estimates suggest an effect of between 2.9 and 7.5 percentage points. In Table 10 , we restrict our ExecuComp sample to only those firms covered by
Hallock's (1998) study of layoff announcements. Point estimates again suggest outside CEO turnover to be associated with subsequent layoffs, but these estimates do not attain statistical significance. We do find non-CEO departure to be a significant predictor of subsequent layoffs, though; our estimate of the effect of a zero to one change in the Any non-CEO Turn t−1 variable is 3.6 percentage points, and this estimate is significant at better than the 1% level. Results in Tables 9 and 10 again suggest that non-CEO disclosure group departure is more closely related to subsequent organizational change than is CEO turnover.
To summarize, we find strong evidence that non-CEO disclosure group departure is associated with subsequent organizational changes. We estimate that, conditional on non-CEO disclosure group departure, the likelihood of subsequent organizational changes (as measured by our three dependent variables) is higher by between 2.5 and 7.5 percentage points. This suggests that non-CEO managers may indeed make investments that are specific to particular ways of doing business, and that organizational changes may often require management team changes as well. 31 We also experimented with interacting the CEO and non-CEO indicators. Coefficients on these variables were typically not significantly different from zero.
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Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored determinants of turnover among non-CEO executives using two panel data sets. We presented five main findings. First, CEO and non-CEO turnover are positively associated. Second, this association does not appear to be stronger when firm performance is poor. Third, this association is driven largely by instances of outside CEO succession. Fourth, the association between CEO and non-CEO changes persists; even in the year after CEO turnover, non-CEO managers are more likely to leave the firm's top management group. Fifth, changes in the identities of non-CEO managers are more closely associated with subsequent organizational changes than is CEO turnover.
We argued that these findings can be best explained with a model in which managers make investments in human capital that is specific to their co-workers. Two competing explanations, correlated signals of managerial ability and option value in promotion tournaments, each yield implications that do not appear to fit the data. If the CEO/non-CEO departure link can be explained by correlation of performance signals, then we would expect this link to be stronger when firm performance is poor. If this link can be explained by lost option value of future promotions, then outside CEO succession should affect non-CEO managers only to the extent that it signals an unwillingness on the part of the firm to promote from within in the future.
Our outside effect is, we believe, too strong to be explained by this factor. In addition, outside CEO succession has a large impact on disclosure group departure for high-ranking non-CEO executives -these executives would, presumably, be less likely to be impacted by signals of a firm's future promotion policies than low-ranking non-CEOs. Future work could fruitfully explore the process by which employees make investments that are specific to co-workers. Given, for example, more detailed information about how long groups worked together, one could attempt to test whether the likelihood of one manager's departure conditional on another's departure was related to the stock of accumulated specific human capital.
